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ADMISSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT REPORTS
REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW
By THomAs C. WooD*
FEDERAL statutes and regulations require numerous accident re-
ports to be made by private companies and governmental agencies.
These reports contain data that could be quite useful to private litigants
in civil actions. This comment examines the admissibility into evidence
of accident reports prepared by public carriers1 and the respective
federal agencies.2 The basic problem concerns a conflict between:
(1) admissibility under the Federal Business Records Act (FBRA),
and (2) the effect of statutory provisions excluding accident reports
from use in civil suits.
ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL BUSINESS
RECORDS ACT
An accident report is hearsay4 when offered in evidence to prove
the truth of a matter stated therein.5 Such an extra-judicial statement
is inadmissible unless it comes within an exception to the hearsay rule.'
At common law one such exception existed for business records.7
Member, Second Year Class.
1Acident reports are required from railroad companies by 74 Stat. 903 (1960),
45 U.S.C. § 38 (1964); from airline companies by 14 C.F.R. § 320.15 (1966); from
motor carriers by 49 C.F.R. § 1944 (1964); and from shipping companies by 18 Stat.
128 (1874), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 361 (1964).
2 The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) is required to make accident reports
by 36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 40 (1964); and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
by 72 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(2) (1964).
328 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964).
4 McCormick gives this definition: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written
evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion
to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter." McCoMicx, EVIDENCE, § 225, at 460 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McCornmc].
5 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
65 WiGMOBE. EvmnENc § 1426 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIoMoRE].
The exceptions number from ten to twenty, depending on the minuteness of the classifi-
cation. McComsxcu § 300.
75 WIGMOpE § 1518. See generally McCoRMc §§ 282-83; MOuGAN ET AL., THE
LAw OF EVIDENcE, SoME PlioposAm.s FoR ITs BREFOBM 51-63 (1927); Green, The Model
and Uniform Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 Tut. L. BEy. 49
(1956); Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276 (1961); Morgan,
The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAnv. L. RPv. 481, 561 (1946); Polasky & Paul-
son, Business Entries-From The Common Law to the New Uniform Rules of Evidence,
4 UTAH L. Ruv. 327 (1955); Note, 48 CoLrum. L. REv. 920 (1948).
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By 1936, the business records exception had lost much of its
utility. A "mass of detailed petty limitations"8 severely restricted its
application.9 To obviate this situation, Congress enacted the Federal
Business Records Act'0 based upon a Model Act proposed by a com-
mittee of legal scholars."- The FBRA provided that a business record
was admissible if made in the regular course of business and if it was
the regular course of that business to make such a record; other con-
siderations were to affect, not the record's admissibility, but only its
probative weight.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court gave its only interpre-
tation of this Act in Palmer v. Hoffman.12 This case involved a railroad
grade crossing accident in which the plaintiff's decedent was killed.
Two days afterwards, the engineer of the train in accordance with
regular company procedure gave his account of the accident in a
report to his superiors. The report tended to exculpate him of negli-
gence and the railroad sought to admit it into evidence. The Supreme
Court affimed denial of the report's admissibility under the FBRA by
holding that it was not made in the regular course of business within
8 5 WIoMoRE § 1520.
9 See generally McCommcx §§ 282-83. Concerning this state of the law, Mr. Justice
Cardozo remarked "that many of the simplest things of life, transactions so common as
the sale and delivery of merchandise, are often the most difficult to prove." Cardozo,
A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. Rzv. 113, 121-22 (1921).
1049 Stat. 1561 (1936). This Act, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1964),
provides: "In any court of the United States and in any court established by an Act of
Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise,
made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be
admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in the
regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make
such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event
or within a reasonable time thereafter.
"All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of
personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but
such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.
"The term 'business,' as used in this section, includes business, profession, occupa-
tion, and calling of every kind."
Laughlin, supra note 7, compares the FBRA with the proposals regarding the busi-
ness records exception contained in the American Law Institutes MODEL CODE OF Evi-
DEN E rule 514 (1942) and in the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws UNiFortm Busnqss REcorDs As EvmENcE AcT and its UNIFORM RULE OF
EvIDENcE 63(13).
1 1 MoRrAN ET AL., Trru LAW OF EvmENcE, Somm Pnoposm.s Fort Irs REFoRM 51-63
(1927), contains the Model Act and comments by the committee that drafted it for the
Commonwealth Fund of New York.
12 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Professor Morgan severely criticizes this decision in Morgan,
The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAuv. L. REV. 481, 565-67 (1946); Professor
Maguire similarly attacks the Court of Appeals' decision in Maguire, Hoffman v. Palmer
-Admissibility of Business Records, 56 HA.4v. L. REV. 458 (1942).
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the meaning of the Act.1 3 The accident report was not a record "made
for the systematic conduct of the business as a business,"" but rather
was "calculated for use essentially in the court;"15 its primary utility
was "in litigating, not in railroading."16 The Court mentions examina-
tion of the record's character and earmarks of reliability as the test
for admissibility under the FBRA, rather than regularity of prepa-
ration.'7
Interpretation of Palmer by the Courts
The Federal courts in applying the Palmer case's narrow interpre-
tation of the FBRA have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the
admissibility of accident reports. 8
The Second Circuit court is the leading advocate for a more liberal
interpretation of the FBRA. In its own decision in Palmer it held the
accident report inadmissible because it was "dripping with motivations
to misrepresent," 9 thus focusing upon the report's untrustworthiness.
In Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc.20 it was held reversible
error for the district court to have refused plaintiff's offer in evidence
of several accident reports. Mr. Justice Douglas' Palmer decision was
distinguished because here the reports were not made for the party
offering them and were "clearly not part of a story cooked up in ad-
vance of litigation in the disguise of business records."21 These reports
were made by boards established by the defendant to investigate all
of its airplane crashes. They were thus found to be made in the regular
'3318 U.S. 109, 111 (1943).
14Id. at 113.
15 Id. at 114.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Compare Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir.
1950) (accident report by Bureau of Mines admitted under FBRA), with Chapman v.
United States, 194 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952) (accident re-
port by Army Air Force Board inadmissible).
19 Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
The court limited its holding to such reports where the maker "knows at the time of
making it that he is very likely, in a probable law suit relating to that accident, to be
charged with wrongdoing as a participant in the accident, so that he is almost certain,
when making the memorandum or report, to be sharply affected by a desire to exculpate
himself and to relieve himself or his employer of liability." Ibid.
The Supreme Court did not use this reasoning as the basis for its affirmance. See
text accompanying note 13 supra.
20 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
21 Id. at 130. Accord, Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951); cf. Terrasi v. South Atl. Lines, 226 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Naylor v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 187 F.2d 538
(2d Cir. 1951); Lopoczyk v. Chester A. Poling, Inc., 152 F.2d 457, 460 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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course of business and admissible under the FBRA. 2 The opinion in-
terpreted the Palmer holding as dealing with a situation where evi-
dence was built up to promote the self-interest of the report's maker.23
The court stressed that the reports were against the interest of the
maker when made and were introduced into evidence by the opposing
party.
In the next two important cases by the Second Circuit on this mat-
ter, Central R.R. v. Jules Sottnek C0.2 4 and Puggioni v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 2 5 the court established that its construction of the Palmer case
gives the trial judge discretion to determine whether the circumstances
surrounding an accident report justify its acceptance as evidence. He
is to examine any indicia of unreliability, such as, the inclusion in the
report of multiple hearsay,26 which would make the report unreliable
and therefore inadmissible.
It also appeared, in Sottnek and Puggioni, that the Pekelis rule was
going to apply only in-cases where admission is sought of an accident
report prepared by one other than the party seeking to admit it.
28
However, this limitation did not last. The court went on in United
States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc. 29 to hold it
error for the district court to exclude from evidence an accident report
22187 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
23 bid.
24258 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
25286 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1961).
26 As Judge L. Hand has stated: "In cases where the entrant records what he has
heard, the document will be evidence of what they have told him only in case it appears
that it was part of their regular course of business to report to him what the declarants
themselves knew, as it was part of his business to record what they said ..... 'Multiple
hearsay' is no more competent now than single hearsay was before." United States v.
Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1948). See generally McCoRwmcK § 286.
2 7 Accord, McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 826 (1965); Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 907 (1964); Pennsylvania R.R. v. The Buchanan Boys, 155 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.
1946).
The Second Circuit recently elaborated on this discretion in LeRoy v. Sabena Bel-
gian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965):
"The district court's discretion with respect to § 1732 is a discretion in judging whether
the document offered 'has an inherent probability of trustworthiness.' Central R.R. v.
Jules S. Sottnek Co., 258 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1958). It is therefore a necessary premise
for its exercise that the document's trustworthiness be in doubt."
Judge Clark, the Second Circuit's most ardent proponent of a liberal interpretation
of the FBRA, insists the Act does not give the trial judge such discretion and, if a record
is made in the regular course of business, the FBRA requires its admission. The other
circumstances are to go toward the record's weight as stated in the Act. For his view see:
United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc., 304 F.2d 792, 799 (2d
Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion); Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, I000 (2d Cir. 1942)
(dissenting opinion), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
28 Puggioni v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 286 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1961).
29304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962).
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filled out by an employee of the party seeking to enter it.30 Palmer was
distinguished because the report here was statutorily required 31 and
thus prepared in the regular course of business within the meaning of
the FBRA.3 2 The court found no reason to doubt the report's relia-
bility. Its primary utility was not in litigation (as was found in Palmer),
but was to assist the evaluation of an injured employee's claim for
compensation. If any litigation was contemplated when the report
was made, it would have been between the employee and his employer
and not his employer and the present defendant.3
The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed its liberal position regarding
the FBRA in Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R.34 The defendant was al-
lowed to put into evidence an accident report it had submitted to the
Secretary of Labor as required by statute. 5 This decision went a step
further than Foreign Trade Zone in that here, any anticipated litigation
would have been between the two present litigants. The court, how-
ever, found that there was no abuse of the district court's discretion
in admitting the report. Sufficient reliability existed because the indi-
vidual who made the report was not personally involved and had no
awareness of the manner in which the report might work to his em-
ployer's benefit. Moreover, no litigation was anticipated at the time."
The Second Circuit has decided no case which directly holds that
an accident report by a federal agency is admissible under the FBRA.
However, if it were the agency s regular business to make such reports
and the district court finds no indicia of unreliability, the report would
undoubtedly be admissible. The court has cited37 favorably Moran v.
30 Id. at 797.
31 The accident report was made in accordance with the Federal Employees' Com-
pensation Act § 24, 39 Stat. 747 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 774 (1964), by an
injured civilian seaman's superior. The employer of the seaman, the United States gov-
ernment, being subrogated to his rights against the defendant, instituted the present ac-
tion. The defendant was the owner of a pier upon which the employee slipped and
injured himself.
32 304 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1962).
33 Ibid.
34344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965).
35 A report was required by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act § 30, 44 Stat. 1439 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 930 (1964), from the
defendant-employer regarding any accident of its employees-in this case Taylor, the
plaintiff.
Judge Friendly reiterated the Second Circuit's position regarding the admissibility
under the FBRA of a statutorily required report, saying: "It would ill become a court
to say that the regular making of reports required by law is not the regular course of
business." Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 34, at 285.
386d. at 286.
37 United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc., 304 F.2d 792,
798-99 (2d Cir. 1962); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122, 130
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
COMMENTS
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,3"8 the leading case holding that ac-
cident reports by governmental agencies are admissible. The closest
factual situation to reach the court was in LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian
World Airlines.3 9 There the court affirmed the admission of a transcript
copied from an appendix in an aircraft accident report prepared by an
agency of the Italian government.4 °
The other federal circuits have not followed the Second Circuit's
liberal interpretation of the FBRA.41 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has called the Pekelis decision a "complete disregard of
what was decided in Palmer,"42 and has said that such cases incorrectly
construe the FBRA.43
The approach employed by these courts is to subject the report to
a more objective test. The court must determine "whether the par-
ticular document was prepared in the course of systematic routine
office procedures to record information relating to, and to be used in,
the routine operations of the business or agency. 4 If the report is not
thus related to the internal, routine operations of the business, these
courts go no further to consider circumstances which might provide
reliability. The document is held not to be made in the regular course
of business as that language of the FBXIA is interpreted.45
Some examples will illustrate the restricted application of the FBRA
that this approach produces. In the Third Circuit, Nuttall v. Reading
Co.4" dealt with a factual situation similar to Palmer.47 Citing Palmer
as authority the court held that signed statements taken by the de-
88 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
39 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
40 Id. at 272. The transcript was of a recording of a conversation between the air-
plane pilot and a traffic controller at the airport.
41 See, e.g., Barnes v. Norfolk So. Ry., 333 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1964); Dilley v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 327 F.2d 249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964);
Cromling v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 327 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1963); Luttrell v.
United States, 320 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1963); La Porte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1962); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 961 (1958), 362 U.S. 943 (1960), 368 U.S. 992 (1962).
42 Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1954).
43 Ibid.
44 LaPorte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1962).
4 5 Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 213 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 975 (1958).
It is sometimes possible, however, for an accident report to be admissible under
some other exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admissible into evidence as an admis-
sion of a party, Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629 (5th Cr. 1957), cf., Caruthers-
ville Towing Co. v. John I. Hay Co., 334 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1964), or as an official
record, Steinberg Dredging Co. v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 196 F.2d 1002 (2d
Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.), cf., United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948).
46 235 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1956).
47 Id. at 550.
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fendant-railroad from its employees regarding an accident were in-
admissible.48 Though the statements were taken during the railroad's
investigation for the trial, the facts might well have been distinguished
from Palmer, and the opposite result reached, had the case been tried
in the Second Circuit. In this case it was the plaintiff who sought to
admit the reports against the interests of the railroad. Under the Pekelis
reasoning49 it might have been found that the statements were taken
in the regular course of business and the fact that they were against
the interests of the entrant would have provided grounds for reliability.
A similar holding to the last case was reached in Dilley v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry. ° in the Sixth Circuit. That court held that it was im-
proper to admit an accident report made by a crew foreman of the
defendant-railroad to his superiors as required by routine company
policy.51 In the Second Circuit it is probable an opposite holding would
have resulted, because in this case it was the plaintiff who introduced
the report into evidence and no indicia of unreliability were present.5 2
This narrow approach does not recognize the routine making of
statutorily required reports as being done in the regular course of
business. Accordingly, copies of income tax returns,53 a copy of a strike
report to Bureau of Labor Statistics," and "sugar reports" required
from certain retailers by the Director of Internal Revenue to control
"moonshining" 5 have been held not admissible under the FBBA.
There are clear indications that under this approach federal
agencies' accident reports do not come within the FBRA. In Chapman
v. United States8 the court noted it was not error for the trial court to
refuse to admit an Army Air Force Board's accident report under the
FBRA5 7 By dictum, it has been stated that an accident report by a
Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation 58 and an accident report
48 Ibid.
49 See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Compare Masterson v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 182 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1950), with Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 191 F.2d
86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
50327 F.2d 249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964).
51 Id. at 251.
52 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
53 Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 222 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 975 (1958).
54 United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 750-51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 824 (1954).
55 Luttrell v. United States, 320 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1963); Matthews v. United
States, 217 F.2d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 1954).
56194 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952).
57 Id. at 978. The court rejected and criticized Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
58 Steward v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 240 F.2d 715, 716-17 (3d Cir. 1957) (dictum).
This dictum was based on a 72 year old United States Supreme Court decision decided
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(containing no opinions or conclusions) by a CAB investigator59 were
inadmissible.
Evaluation of the Two Interpretations
In comparing the two conflicting interpretations given to the FBRA
by the federal courts of appeals, it appears that the approach followed
by the majority is unduly narrow and limited. The drafters of the Model
Act upon which the FBRA is based intended a broad remedial statute
which would eliminate the difficulties present in the common law for
admitting business records into evidence.60 It was the considered
judgment of those legal scholars 1 that only one requirement was neces-
sary for admission. That requirement was regularity of the record's
making by the company in question.2 All other circumstances of the
making were to affect the record's probative weight, but not keep it
from being admitted.
The judicial gloss that is given the FBRA by these courts which
require the document to have a close relation and utility to the in-
ternal functions of the business63 is unwarranted. That the statute was
not intended to be so narrowly construed is indicated by comments
of the Model Act's chief drafters. Professor Morgan denounces the
Palmer decision as typical of those cases which hamper attempts to
reform the rules of evidence.64 He has stated that a restrictive in-
terpretation "has been enforced by Courts of Appeals ... to exclude
many records that fall squarely within the language of the statute."65
Professor Wigmore, lamenting the fact that courts have not always
been ready to give full effect to the spirit of this legislation, criticized
the refusal of a court to admit a police officer's accident report, stating:
"the most explicit words of a statute do not always avail to change the
cerebral operations of the Judiciary .... 66
before the FBRA and in the absence of any exclusionary provision (see text accompany-
ing note 108 infra), The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 69 (1885).
59Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963).
60 MORGAN, ET AL., ThE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SomE PRoposALs FOR ITS REFORm
51-63 (1927).
61 The distinguished committee contained Professors Edmund M. Morgan (chair-
man), John H. Wigmore, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Ralph W. Gifford, Edward W. Hinton,
and Edson R. Sunderland, Charles M. Hough, Judge of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, and William A. Johnston, Chief Justice of the supreme court of Kansas.
62 Morgan, op. cit. supra note 60, at 63. For the purposes of the present analysis
the requirement of the FBRA that it be the regular course of the business to record the
event at the time of its occurrence or within a reasonable time thereafter is not discussed
as a separate test. Such requirement is reasonable and not disputed.
63 See Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276, 289 (1961).
64 Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HA.v. L. REv. 481, 565-66 (1946).
6 5 MOacAN, BAsIc Ps OB.EmS OF EVIDENCE 312 (1961).
66 5 WoGmoRE § 1530a, n.1, at 392.
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The mere fact that the legislative discussion preceding the enact-
ment of the FBRA did not specifically mention accident reports should
not preclude their inclusion as business records.6 7 It was only natural
for the discussion to focus upon the most common and numerous ac-
counting-type documents. The above comments by drafters of the
proposed remedial statute show accident reports are within its intended
scope.
The liberal interpretation of the FBRA by the Second Circuit is in
harmony with contemporary attitudes regarding reform of the law of
evidence. 8 This approach provides the trial judge with discretionary
power in these matters. Even though an accident report is prepared
in the regular course of business, the judge still has discretion to refuse
its admission if there is reason to doubt its reliability.69 The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in cooperation
with the American Law Institute include in their recommended rule
on business records a similar discretion for the trial judge.70 These
rules have received the approval of the American Bar Association.7'
EFFECT OF EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS ON
ACCIDENT REPORT ADMISSIBILITY
An exclusionary provision in a statute requiring an accident report
will prohibit the report's use in civil litigation. Such provisions cover
reports by railway72 and motor carriers7" and the regulating govern-
mental agencies.74 The typical language provides that the required re-
port shall not be admitted as evidence, or used for any purpose, in an
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in the report.
67 See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 1000 n.6 (2d Cir. 1942) (dissenting
opinion by Clark, J.), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). For an account of this legislative dis-
cussion see Judge Frank's opinion in Hoffman v. Palmer, supra at 987.
68 SeeUNwForm RuLE oF EVIDENcE 63(13); Ray, Business Records-A Proposed
Rule of Admissibility, 5 Sw. L.J. 33 (1951).
69 See Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 907 (1964). This is a compromise position short of a literal interpretation of the
FBRA advocated by Judge Clark, supra note 27.
7 o UNworom RULE OF EvmENcE 63(13) excludes from the category of inadmissible
hearsay: '"ritings offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove
the facts stated therein, if the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of a
business at or about the time of the act, condition or event recorded, and that the sources
of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness." (Emphasis added.)
7178 A.B.A. Rep. 134 (1953).
72 36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
7854 Stat. 927 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 320(f) (1964).
7454 Stat. 927 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 320(f) (1964) (ICC motor carrier reports);
36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1964) (ICC railroad reports); 72 Stat. 781 (1958),
49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1964) (CAB aircraft reports).
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Conflict With the FBRA
The exclusionary statutes, when juxtaposed with the FBRA, present
an apparent conflict in the law.75 The former make accident reports
privileged and thus inadmissible as evidence, whereas the latter pro-
vides that reports made in the regular course of business are admissible.
The Supreme Court's Palmer decision contains dictum addressed to
this problem. The Court stated:
We can hardly suppose that Congress modified or qualified by im-
plication these long standing statutes [exclusionary provisions] when
it permitted records made "in the regular course" of business to be
introduced.76
No federal court has directly confronted this conflict, though some
dicta have indicated adherence to the above statement. 7 Recently,
however, in Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,78 the court questioned the
Palmer dictum in cases where the maker of the report seeks to admit
his own copy." The court reasoned that in enacting provisions ex-
cluding company reports from evidence, "Congress was not thinking
of the case, which could hardly have been envisioned under the then
state of the law, where the carrier would attempt to use statements in
the report in its favor."8 This question was not ruled on, however,
because the plaintiff did not make a timely objection based on the
exclusionary provision. The railroad was allowed to enter into evidence
its accident report under the FBRA exception to the hearsay rule."'
Unanimity is lacking among the courts in the application of ex-
clusionary statutes. This variance is apparent where the document
sought to be admitted is not the final accident report itself, but is
part of the investigation. The courts disagree on whether or not the
75 In those courts which do not recognize reports required by statute as being cov-
ered by the FBRA, no conflict appears. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
76Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 (1943) (dictum). As a basis for this
dictum, the Supreme Court infers that the purpose of exclusionary provisions was to
exclude untrustworthy reports. Professor Morgan objects that their purpose is not to
exclude untrustworthy reports, but is to prevent their use as admissions of a party. Mor-
gan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 H Av. L. REv. 481, 567 (1946). The Con-
gressional debates on the exclusionary provision for railroad company reports do not
support the Court's inference. 45 CoNrG. REC. 155-59, 3459-60 (1909).
77Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 895 (1963); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Frank, 214 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D. Conn.
1963). See generally Note, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 920, 931 (1948).
78 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1965) (dictum).
79 Ibid. Cf. Lousiville & No. R.R. v. Grant, 234 Ky. 276, 27 S.W.2d 980 (Ct. App.
1930) (plaintiff's offer in evidence of defendant railroad's copy of its accident report
denied under § 4, 36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1964)).
80 Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1965) (dictum).
81 Id. at 285.
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privilege covering the reports extends to documents upon which the
reports are based.82
Regarding company accident reports, the exclusionary provisions
are normally interpreted as intended to induce complete and candid
reports by the carriers.83 Nonetheless, some courts put a narrow con-
struction on the exclusionary statutes in order to make privileged only
the accident report itself .84 The contention that the statutory privilege
should also cover the accident investigation records because they are
compiled for the purpose of making the privileged reports is rejected.85
On the other hand, this contention is accepted by other courts.8" In
these cases the reasoning is that it would violate the spirit of the
statute if it were interpreted not to include data gathered during the
investigation."
Regarding agency reports, the handling of investigatory docu-
ments of the Civil Aeronautics Board affords an example of the usual
approach. The applicable exclusionary statute s is interpreted as re-
vealing a Congressional "intention to preserve the functions of the
court and jury uninfluenced by the findings [i.e. opinions and conclu-
sions] of the Board or investigators."89 By thus constricting the breadth
of the provision's effect, courts have held admissible: a CAB investi-
gator's report containing only facts, ° a letter from an airline official
89 Compare Coosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963), with Crad-
dock v. Queen City Coach Co., 264 N.C. 380, 141 S.E.2d 798 (1965).88 Louisville & No. R.R. v. Grant, 234 Ky. 276, 27 S.W.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1930);
see 45 CoNG. Mc. 155 (1909) (remarks by Representative Mann).84 Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Yanick v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 192 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1,
245 P.2d 224 (1952); cf. Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern By., 297 F.2d 921 (4th.Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964); Bums v. New York Cent. R.R., 33 F.R.D. 309
(N.D. Ohio 1963).
85 Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 17, 245 P.2d 224, 233 (1952).
86 Craddock v. Queen City Coach Co., 264 N.C. 380, 141 S.E.2d 798 (1965); cf.
Richards v. Maine Cent. R.R., 21 F.R.D. 593 (D. Me. 1957).87 Craddock v. Queen City Coach Co., supra note 86, at 382, 141 S.E.2d at 800.
8872 Stat. 781 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1964) provides: "No part of any
report or reports of the Board relating to any accident or the investigation thereof, shall
be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report or reports."
It should be noted that this statute does not make accident reports by the airlines
privileged. A good analysis of the cases involving this Act up to 1950 is found in Simp-
son, Use of Aircraft Accident Investigation Information in Actions for Damages, 17
J. Am L. & Com. 283 (1950).
89 Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1951); accord, Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963); Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499, 519 (D.
Del. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965).
90 Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
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to the CAB relating to an accident investigation, 91 and statements by
a pilot of a crashed airplane to a CAB investigator 2 One court has
also adopted this restrictive approach in construing a similar exclu-
sionary statute concerning accident reports by the ICC.
Consideration of the Underlying Policies
The resolution of the conflict caused by the cross-purposes of the
exclusionary provisions and the FBRA requires a consideration of
these statutes' underlying policies. The FBRA, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, is directed at increasing the body of evidence placed
before the trier of fact for consideration in its quest for truth. Exclu-
sionary provisions are based upon two rationales: (1) for carrier
reports it is the desire to obtain from private companies factual reports
of accidents which may reveal the need for regulatory legislation for
the public welfare,94 and (2) for federal agency reports it is the
desire to protect the trier of fact from being influenced by agency
findings.9
5
It is submitted that the rationale of inducing factual reporting is
unsound. Its objective is obtainable without making company reports
privileged. Exclusionary provisions making these accident reports
privileged are based upon the assumption that if the reports are avail-
able as evidence they will necessarily be incomplete or erroneous.90
A company would not report inculpatory evidence for fear of its use
in a possible law suit. The premise of this argument is the belief that:
(1) a party would either not thoroughly investigate its accidents due
to fear of uncovering incriminating facts, or (2) whatever incrimin-
ating information is discovered would be omitted from or erroneously
entered in the required report.
In regard to the first half of this premise, there is a compelling
U.S. 945 (1952). Statements of opinion by investigators are not admissible. Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. Frank, 214 F. Supp. 803 (D. Conn. 1963). However, exclusionary provisions
do not prohibit direct testimony by the investigator concerning what he actually ob-
served. Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(CAB investigator permitted to testify); Hines v. Kelley, 252 S.W. 1033 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1923) (company investigator permitted to testify).
91 Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 200 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
92 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Aviation Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Cline, 395 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
93 Yanick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 192 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); but see Gour-
ley v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 295 Ill. App. 160, 14 N.E.2d 842 (1938).
94 See Louisville & No. R.R. v. Grant, 234 Ky. 276, 27 S.W.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1930);
45 CoNG. 11c. 155 (1909) (remarks by Representative Mann).
95See Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 895 (1963); 45 CONG. EEc. 156 (1909) (remarks by Representative Olmsted).
96 See statements by Representative Mann made in the House during the debate
on the first exclusionary provision for railroad accident reports. 45 CoNG. PEc. 155
(1909).
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economic reason why a company must maintain competent accident
investigating machinery 7 Accidents cost the company money. They
cause loss of lives, equipment, time, contracts, and customers, plus
expensive law suits. To minimize costs all the facts must be uncovered
so faulty equipment can be replaced, unsafe designs and systems cor-
rected, and unqualified personnel trained or discharged.9 The com-
pany must investigate in order to decide intelligently whether to settle
or fight a law suit, to guard against surprises if it litigates, and to
uncover exculpatory facts.99
In regard to the second half of the premise-that inculpatory in-
formation will be omitted or erroneously entered-there are three
reasons to doubt the necessity for exclusionary statutes to prevent this
occurrence.
First, there are statutory sanctions provided to ensure reliable re-
ports. Railroad reports must be made under oath which subjects the
maker to prosecution for false swearing if the report is falsified; 00
motor carrier reports, if falsified, make the company subject to heavy
fines.10 1 The federal government provides standard forms which must
be filled out for each accident.102 Regardless of the existence of any
exclusionary provisions, the carrier can be expected to enter the re-
quired minimum of information truthfully, though in the light most
favorable to it.
0 3
Second, the protection provided by the exclusionary provisions
affords little or no inducement to report inculpatory facts which
otherwise might go unreported. Prohibiting use of the report as evi-
9
7 A good description of aircraft accident investigation machinery of a large airline
company is given in Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122, 126 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
98 See Norville, The Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act, 27 OBE. L. REV.
188, 230 (1948). Additionally, of course, certain information must be gathered in order
to make the required accident report.
99 See Yanick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 192 F. Supp. 373, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
300 The oath is required by 74 Stat. 903 (1960), 45 U.S.C. § 38 (1964). Prosecu-
tion for perjury, including false swearing, is provided for in the Federal Criminal Code,
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964).
10154 Stat. 928 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 32 2(g) (1964), and 63 Stat. 488 (1949), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 322(h) (Supp. I, 1965); cf. Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963) ($2,800 fine for false report on hours worked by
driver); Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 255 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1958).
102See 49 C.F.R. § 125. (1966) (railroad reports); 49 C.F.R. § 194.4 (1964)
(motor carrier reports).
103 Interview With Mr. G. Graham, Safety Inspector for the Interstate Commerce
Commission's Bureau of Operations and Compliance, in San Francisco, Oct. 5, 1966.
This same view was expressed by Representative Sims during the debate over the first
exclusionary statute for railroad reports: "I think . . . that the railroad companies re-
porting under this act will tell the truth, and that they will tell it in such a light as
to bear lightest upon their own liability; therefore, I do not see why they should be
exempt from liability." 45 CONG. REc. 156 (1909).
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dence does not preclude use by an adversary of facts revealed within
the report. Such information can be introduced into evidence by call-
ing the individual who investigated the accident to testify as to what
he personally observed.104 In addition, facts uncovered by the carrier's
investigation are already available to a litigant in many jurisdictions
through discovery'0 5 and subpoena duces tecum procedures. 00 Hence,
the exclusionary statutes have no appreciable effect upon the complete-
ness of carrier reports.
The third reason casting doubt on the necessity for exclusionary
provisions to ensure reliability is the absence of such provisions for
similar accident reports from airline 07 and shipping °8 companies.
Accident reports by these enterprises are not privileged and have been
used as evidence against them in actions for damages. 09 There is no
apparent reason why it is necessary for railway and motor carrier re-
ports to be privileged to ensure reliability, whereas no privilege is
deemed necessary for just as important reports from airline and ship-
ping companies.
It is submitted that the rationale of keeping agency findings from
the trier of fact is also unsound. The premise of this rationale is that
by presenting to the trier of fact a report by a presumedly unbiased
and competent authority, the case will be prejudiced. It is feared the
104 Hines v. Kelley, 252 S.W. 1033 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923). Necessary informa-
tion regarding the identity of the investigators, their whereabouts, etc., is obtainable
by interrogatory in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Buining v. The Transporter,
171 F. Supp. 127 (D. Md. 1959); Bartol v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 387 (D.
Md. 1963).
105 FED. R. Civ. P. 34. See Goosman v. A. Dule Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir.
1963); Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 985 (1964); Burns v. New York Cent. R.R., 33 F.R.D. 309 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
-0 6 FaD. R. Civ. P. 45(b). See Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Landgraf v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
.
0 7 Airline companies are required to make accident reports by 14 C.F.R. § 320.15
(a) (1966).
108 Shipping companies are required to make accident reports by 18 Stat. 128 (1874),
as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 361 (1964). These reports are submitted to the United States
Coast Guard, which has supervision over marine accident investigations. See 49 Stat. 1381
(1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 239 (1964); 46 C.F.R. § 136 (1966). The regula-
tions require an accident report by the owner, agent, master, or person in charge of
the vessel. Normally the ship's master makes the report as agent of the shipping com-
pany. See, e.g., Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1957).
1o9 Caruthersville Towing Co. v. John I. Hay Co., 334 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1964);
Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1957); Sternberg Dredging Co. v.
Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 196 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1952); Tansey v. Transcon-
tinental & W. Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949); Aviation Enterprises, Inc. v.
Cline, 395 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); of. Brown & Root, Inc. v. American Home
Assur. Co., 353 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943 (1966); Maxwell
v. Fink, 264 Wis. 106, 58 N.W.2d 415 (1953).
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trier will not give due consideration to the rest of the evidence in
reaching its verdict.
This objection that opinion or conclusion introduced into evidence
invades the province or usurps the function of the jury is not compel-
ling."0 An agency's accident report-even one containing opinion as
to the ultimate issue-is not conclusive proof binding upon the trier of
fact."' Nor is the case prejudiced. Though an agency opinion is ex-
pressed as to the accident's cause, the adverse party is free to introduce
evidence to refute that conclusion or show why liability does not
necessarily follow."12 Facts and testimony in addition to those con-
sidered by the agency can be introduced for the jury to weigh. In the
end result the jury is free to make its own evaluation of all the facts,
giving to each piece of evidence the weight it is thought to deserve.
As Professor McCormick has cogently argued:
The question is, how far do we wish to facilitate the use, in the judi-
cial process, of the results of the investigative and fact-finding opera-
tions of administrative officials? As to most such reports, on account
of the nearness of the investigation to the time of the event, and of
the element of official responsibility, I believe the courts' fact-finding
will gain by their use." 3
1O Regarding this objection, one court has stated: "As Wigmore puts it: such
reason is 'a mere bit of empty rhetoric' and that '. . . no legal power, not even the
judge's order, can compel them [the jury] to accept the witness's opinion against their
own."' United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1963).
There is a divergence of views regarding the effect of opinion in reports sought
to be admitted under the FBRA. Some courts hold that if the report qualifies under
the FBRA, then the inclusion of expert opinion only affects the report's probative weight.
Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 951 (1951); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir.
1950). This position is premised upon the normal requirement that the opinion must
concern a matter calling for special skill, experience, or knowledge, and that the
declarant must be so qualified. Barnes v. Norfolk So. Ry., 333 F.2d 192, 197 (4th Cir.
1964); Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 975 (1958). A few courts have held that if the opinion is mere conjecture and
subject to disagreement, the report is inadmissible. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), 362 U.S. 943 (1960), 368
U.S. 992 (1962) (5-to-4 decision); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297
(D.C. Cir. 1944) (vigorous dissenting opinion by Edgerton, J.). Contra, Thomas
v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1962); Medina v. Erickson, "226 F.2d 475 (9th Cir.
1955).
"'1See Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535, 543 (4th Cir. 1956). See gen-
erally 7 WiMoBE §§ 1920-21; McConwnc= § 12. The recently adopted Evidence
Code in California has codified the following provision: "Testimony in the form of an
opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." CAL. Evm-cE CODE. § 805.
12 See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950);
Sociedad De Transportes Maritimos v. Panama Canal Co., 163 F. Supp. 151 (D. Canal
Zone 1958), aff'd, 272 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1959).
11" McCormick, Hearsay, 10 RuTGErs L. REv. 620, 627 (1956) (discussing admis-
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CONCLUSION
The conflict between admission of company and agency reports
under the FBRA and their exclusion under the exclusionary statutes
should be resolved in favor of admissibility. The proper attitude should
be to treat such statutes "as stumbling blocks in the jury's search for
truth."-"4 The above analysis has shown that the exclusionary provi-
sions for carrier reports are not necessary to have thorough accident
investigation and reliable reporting. Further, it was contended that the
reluctance to admit agency accident reports should give way in defer-
ence to the trier of fact's search for truth. Therefore, to resolve this
conflict, it is recommended that the exclusionary statutes for railroad,
motor carrier, ICC, and CAB accident reports be repealed." 5
The repeal of these exclusionary statutes would provide litigants
with an inexpensive source of relevent information. By allowing an
accident report to be used as evidence of the facts and expert opinion
contained therein, money and time (both that of the litigants and the
court) would be saved by not having to call witnesses to testify on
these matters."" This advantage would realize one of the major pur-
poses for a Business Records Act discussed by the Model Act's drafters,
sibility under UNIFOwmv RuLE OF EVmENCE 63 (15)). In some jurisdictions non-privileged
accident reports by public officials are admissible under the FBRA despite opinion or
conclusion contained therein. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., supra note 112
(Bureau of Mines report on explosion); ociedad De Transportes Maritimos v. Panama
Canal Co., supra note 112 (marine accident report by Board of Local Inspectors); see
Salsberg v. Modem Transfer Co., 324 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1963) (police accident report);
McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 198 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1952) (police accident report);
cf. Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1966) (police accident report);
Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962) (police accident report); Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Stevens, 21 App. Div. 2d 556, 251 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1964)
(police accident report). Contra, Chapman v. United States, 194 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.
1952) (Air Force, aircraft, accident report); Yates v. Bair Transp., Inc., 249 F. Supp.
681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (police accident report); see The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 69
(1885) (marine accident report by Board of Local Inspectors); Steward v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 240 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1957) (accident report by Coast Guard Marine
Board of Investigation); cf. Kramer v. Barnes, 212 Cal. App. 2d 440, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895
(1963) (police accident report); Voight v. Voight, 22 Wis. 2d 573, 126 N.W.2d 543
(1964) (police accident report). See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1959).
114 Krizak v. W. C. Brooks & Sons, 320 F.2d 37, 45 (4th Cir. 1963).
115 These statutes were cited in notes 72-74 supra. The more satisfactory sanction
to ensure reliability is to make falsification a criminal offense and impose heavy fines.
Such legislation already exists for motor carrier reports (see note 101 supra) and is
evidently a successful and sufficient deterrent for airline accident reports. 72 Stat. 785
(1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(e) (1964), makes it a misdemeanor for an air carrier, his
agent, etc. to falsify a report, and provides for a maximum fine of $5,000.
i6 See McCormick, Hearsay, 10 R=rmis L. Bav. 620, 626-27 (1956). The burden
then would be on the adversary to call witnesses to refute any facts in contention, and
possibly to call for cross-examination a person who expressed expert opinion included
in the report.
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namely, reduction of the exorbitant cost a litigant faces in proving
certain facts."17
It is the injured and possibly indigent patron and employee who
stand to gain most from the repeal of these statutes. In more cases
they would be able to afford to initiate legal proceedings to acquire
compensation. Making available an inexpensive, ready source of evi-
dence to an injured customer of a public carrier would complement
the common law policy of holding public carriers to a higher degree of
responsibility." 8 In addition, the repeal is consistent with the modem
trend toward expanding enterprise liability which, applied to the
present problem, would seem to dictate assisting the patron and
employee." 9
The proposals recommended to liberalize admissibility under the
FBRA (monitored by judicial discretion) and to repeal the exclusion-
ary statutes are supported by the venerable counsel of Professor Thayer:
A true analysis would probably restate the law so as to make what
we call the hearsay rule the exception, and make our main rule this,
namely, that whatsoever is relevant is admissible.1
20
11 7 See United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc., 304 F.2d
792 (2d Cir. 1962); MoarAN, ET AL.., THE LAw OF EvmENCE, Sowm PRoposALS FoR
ITs RFxom 57 (1927). In Foreign Trade Zone the court stated: "[Tihe purpose behind
the Federal Business Records Act is to permit the introduction into evidence of reports
in substitution for the actual testimony in court of the persons making the reports:'
United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc., supra at 797.
18 See Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880).
110 See Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 165 (1965). As Professor Steffen suggests: "it is possible that there is growing
acceptance of the idea that enterprise should accept final responsibility." Id. at 176.
120 Thayer, A PBEr nAL y TanE&m oN EvmE~cE AT T Commor LAW 522
(1898).
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